

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL

vs.

ARAKI, SADAIO ET AL

Affidavit of

TANAKA, Ryukichi

I have known General Hata very well ever since December 1924, when I was working on the General Staff and our relations privately and officially have been very close. I am one of his friends who knows him best. When in July of 1940 General Hata resigned as War Minister in the Yonai Cabinet, he resigned against his will. Hata had consistently supported the Yonai Cabinet and its policies and it was only because of the receipt of the letter from the Chief of the General Staff requiring him to resign that Hata did resign his post. It was well known in the Army that General Hata was **strongly opposed to the Tripartite Pact**. At the time of his fall, General Hata was War Minister in name only because a successor had already been decided upon in army circles. So strongly was he opposed by those around him that his orders were not being obeyed. He was opposed and obstructed at every turn. By being boycotted by the army, his position was disregarded.

In the evening of 9 December 1940, I met General Anami who was Vice-Minister of War under General Hata, and we had dinner at a small restaurant called Kensui in Akasaka. The question of the sudden resignation of General Hata from the position of War Minister in the Yonai Cabinet came up and General Anami at that time told me that Hata had resigned in accordance with a demand received by him in a letter from Prince Kanin, the Chief of the General Staff. On the 14th of February 1945, I met General Anami at the Kokuryo. At that time, General Anami with whom I had been very friendly told me, "I regret very much the part I played in forcing General Hata to resign as War Minister of the Yonai Cabinet".

Hata although he had risen to the high rank of War Minister did not have any group or clique of his own to support him in the War Ministry and with impunity he was isolated by others in the War Ministry even while he held the high position of War Minister. The hatred and dislike of General Hata persisted from the day when he first supported the readjustment plan of the army when General Ugaki was War Minister and increased when he became War Minister in the Abo Cabinet, which Cabinet preceded the Yonai Cabinet. Two incidents served to heighten the hatred and dislike for Hata. The first was that another man had been recommended by the Three Chiefs' Council to be War Minister in the Abo Cabinet, but by special circumstances the position was not given to that officer but instead General Hata became War Minister. A further incident which served to aggravate the antipathy felt by those in high army circles was the following: General Hata was strongly opposed to the participation by army officers in politics and when he became War Minister for the first time, he addressed all the officers in the War Ministry Building. The gist of the speech was as follows:

The present army is not trusted by anyone and it is the first duty of the army to endeavor to recover the country's trust. In order to achieve this objective, all military personnel should absolutely cease any participation in politics and return to their regular duties of soldiering.

Furthermore, immediately on his becoming War Minister, Hata ordered the Kempeitai to cease participation in politics. Consequently, he was not popular among them. In 1939, when General Hata learned that a certain Colonel

made a speech in Sendai attacking the United States and England and saying, "Down with those countries!", he became indignant and immediately ordered him back to Tokyo and reprimanded him severely and then transferred him to an outlying post.

This hatred and dislike of Hata increased more and more because he had forbidden the Army's participation in politics, and those who opposed him were hoping and waiting for an opportunity to have him thrown out of office. His opposition to the Tripartite Pact, his support of the Yonai Cabinet and its policies, and his desire to end the China Incident by the reduction and then the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China intensified the spirit of opposition to Hata and eventually resulted in his downfall by express demands of the Chief of the General Staff himself.

Although Hata was a high-ranking officer and a War Minister, as a Japanese he could not have refused to obey the demand of Prince Kanin to resign. Because Prince Kanin was a member of the Imperial House and stood second only to the Crown Prince himself, Hata had no choice as a subject of the Emperor but to bow respectfully to the demand and this was quite natural for a Japanese subject. Although they disliked him very much, they could do nothing to him and they finally succeeded in bringing about his downfall only by use of the office of Prince Kanin. From the morals and customs of the Japanese people, he could not help but obey the words of a member of the family of the household of the Emperor, because to a subject they were regarded as absolute. Prince Kanin was particularly high in his rank because the Emperor Meiji had recommended that Prince Kanin should be the next emperor in the event there should be no one in direct line to succeed the Emperor Taisho.

With reference to General Hata's belief that the only way to bring about peace with China was by evacuating the whole of the Japanese troops from China or if that was not possible to withdraw the troops gradually little by little until it was completed, I know that in 1940 when Hata was War Minister despite the opposition of the General Staff he reduced the strength of the Japanese forces in China as the first step in his program from 900,000 to approximately 600,000.

Coming to the question of the establishment of the Wang Ching Wei Government, General Hata did not approve of it at all because he had secretly carried out peace negotiations with the Chungking Government and also had planned to evacuate the whole of the Japanese troops from China. The preparations and plans for the establishment of the Wang Ching Wei Government had already been decided upon as a national policy during the First Kono Cabinet and the Hiranuma Cabinet and only the formalities of its establishment took place during the Yonai Cabinet. General Hata had no connections with the establishment of the Wang Ching Wei Government.

In 1940, when General Hata was War Minister, the question arose of the use of Chinese prisoners of war in the coal mines of Japan. General Hata opposed the plan and because of his opposition it fell through. In 1942, when General Hata was Commander in Chief of the Japanese forces in China, he again opposed successfully the plan which was suggested for using Chinese laborers in the coal mines in Japan. It was not until 1944 that Chinese laborers were brought to Japan and then it was through the Greater East Asia Ministry. General Hata had nothing to do with it and he did not have any control over it, because the supervision of labor had already been detached from army control and had come under the Greater East Asia Ministry.

In the Fall of 1939 when Hata was War Minister in the Yonai Cabinet, I began, in accordance with the desires of General Hata, negotiations with Chang Kai Shek for a peaceful settlement of the China Incident. Because of strong opposition to the way Hata wanted to bring about peace with China, namely by the reduction and then the withdrawal of troops, we had to work unofficially and under cover. General Hata did what he could to start us off properly. A great deal of money was needed to carry on the lengthy negotiations and through my introduction of the wealthy merchant Iwazaki, Seishichi we received the necessary financial backing. General Hata gave me two points on which to

work. One was to arrange the dates and place for the two messengers, one from Hata and one from Chang Kai Shek, to meet and the second was that the basis of the peace treaty would be the evacuation of all Japanese troops from China. To show his good faith, General Hata, as I have previously stated, reduced the number of Japanese troops in China from 900,000 to approximately 600,000 when the next budget was proposed. However, there was great opposition from within the War Ministry and the General Staff to any withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. It was insisted that Japanese troops should be permanently kept in the Shanghai and North China areas. Hata opposed this desire. He believed that we must evacuate all the troops from China. It was his contention that if we did not evacuate Japanese troops from China there would be absolutely no hope of concluding a peace treaty with Chang Kai Shek. The necessary negotiations with Chang Kai Shek were so secret that at first the preliminary steps had to be carried out with signal codes. It was very difficult to convince the side of Chang Kai Shek that a sincere attempt was being made to bring about peace. Gradually, however, they were convinced and came to believe that a peace treaty was possible and started deciding on dates and places for future meetings. If General Hata had remained in office as War Minister, I do not have any doubt that a successful peace treaty would have been concluded. However, not long after General Hata had suddenly resigned his office, the negotiations came to an end.

General Hata, when a young officer, had been sent to study in Germany and as an intelligent man he had soon discovered the defects of Germany and had come to know them very well, while on the other hand he came to acknowledge the merits of America and the British Empire and so he was always opposed to anything which might even suggest a disagreement or a clash with America and the British Empire. It was for that reason that he was so strongly opposed to the Tripartite Pact. In 1941, when he was Commander in Chief of the Japanese forces in China and when it seemed as though relations between Japan and America were steadily deteriorating, Hata sent as his personal emissary General Ushirogu who was his Chief of Staff to Tokyo to express his views on his opposition to any road or action which might lead to trouble with America and the British Empire. Officially, General Ushirogu went to Tokyo on some official matter but privately the real purpose for his trip was to state to the persons in high office at the time General Hata's opposition to any inauguration of war with America or the British Empire. After having made the rounds of all the persons in high positions, General Ushirogu came to me and told me what he had been doing under instructions from General Hata. I tried my best to help carry out the wishes of Hata as expressed by General Ushirogu but from my position as Chief of the Military Service Section there was very little that I could do but I did try my best to express and realize the ideas and opinions of Hata to everyone who would listen.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TANAKA, Ryukichi (Seal)

On this 26th day of August, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: TANAKA, Ryukichi (Seal)

I, KOKUBU, Tomoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,
at Tokyo

Witness: KOKUBU, Tomoharu (Seal)

Not Used

Def, Doc#2206

Exh, NO

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述書

供述者 田中隆吉

自分儀我國ニ行ハル方式ニ從ヒ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ如ク供述致シマス

私ハ一九二四年參謀本部ニ勤務シタ時カラ、畑大將ト公私共ニ深い關係ガアリマス。從ツテ私ハ畑大將ヲ最モヨク知ツテ居ルモノノ一人デアリマス。一九四〇年七月畑俊六大將ガ米内々閣陸相ヲ辭職シタノハ其ノ本意ニ出タモノデハアリマセンデシタ。畑大將ハ終始一貫シテ、米内々閣及ビ其ノ方針ヲ支持シテ居ラレマシタ。大將ガ辭任サレタノハ一ニ參謀總長ガ辭任ヲ要求シタ書簡ヲ畑大將ニ送ツタコトニ因リマス。軍デハ畑大將ガ三國同盟ニ強ク反對デアツタコトハ衆知ノコトデアリマシタ。畑大將ハ米内總理ニ辭表ヲ出ス以前ニ既ニ陸相ニシテ、陸相ニアラズト謂フコトガ出來マス。即チ畑大將ハ陸軍ノボイコツトニヨツテ、既ニソノ地位ヲ否定セラレ、陸軍部内ニハ後繼陸軍大臣ヲ内定シテ居タタノデアリマス。

當時畑氏ハ周圍ノ者カラ手酷シク反對ヲ受ケテ居リマシタノデ、命令ハ殆ンド服從サレズ何ヲヤツテモ、陰ニ反對ヲ受ケ、又邪魔ヲサレテ居リマシタ。

一九四〇年十二月九日私ハ米内々閣當時畑大將ノ下デ陸軍次官ヲシテ居ツタ阿南大將ト赤坂ノ錦水ト忝フ料亭デ夕食ヲ共ニシマシタ。ソノ時畑大將ガ米内内閣ノ陸相ヲ急ニ辭任サレタノガ話ニ出マシタ。阿南大將ハ私ニ「畑サンハ參謀總長閑院官殿下ノ御書簡ヲ頂カレ、其ノ御要求ニ從ツテ辭職シタノダ」ト申シマシタ。

其後一九四五年二月十四日私ハ航空寮デ阿南大將ニ會ヒマシタ。
 阿南大將ハ私ト親シカッタノデシタガ其時次ノ様ニ言ヒマシタ。
 「僕ハ畑サンニ米内々閣ノ陸相ヲヤメサセルノニ一役買ツタノヲ非常ニ
 後悔シテ居ル」ト、畑サンハ陸軍大臣トナラレテモ陸軍省内デハ支持シ
 テクレル派モ闊モ持タズ陸軍大臣ノ要職ニ在リナガラ、陸軍省ニ於テ弧
 立シテ居タヤウナ有様デシタ。畑大將ニ對スル憎惡ト嫌惡ノ念ハ先ヅ宇
 垣ヲ支持シテ軍備整理ニ努力シタコトカラ、ハジマリ阿部内閣デ畑サン
 ガハジメテ、陸軍大臣ニナラレタ時又其ノ度ヲ加ヘマシタ。
 畑大將ニ對スル憎惡ト嫌惡ハ右ノ二ツノ事情デ益々増長シテ行マシタ。
 其レハ阿部内閣ノ陸軍大臣ハ陸軍三長官會議デハ別ノ者ガ推薦サレタノ
 デアリマスガ、特別ノ事情デ、其ノ者ガ陸相ニナラズニ、畑大將ガ代ツ
 テ陸相トナツタコトデアリマス。
 更ニ陸軍部内ニ於テ畑大將ニ對スル反感ハ次ノヤウナ事件デ益々高マル
 一方デアリマシタ。
 畑大將ハ軍人ガ政治ニ關與スルコトヲ極端ニ嫌ヒマシタ。
 彼ガ陸軍大臣ニナツタ時、陸軍省ノ全將校ヲ集メテ最初ノ訓示ヲシマシ
 タ。
 其ノ要旨ハ「今ノ陸軍ハ信用ガナイ、陸軍ハ先ヅ第一ニ、信用サレル陸
 軍ニナラナケレバナラナイ、夫レガタメニハ、陸軍軍人ガ其ノ本分ヲ忘

レテ、今マデノ様ニ、政治ニ關與スルコトヲ絶對ニ止メルベキデアールト言フノデアリマシタ。

更ニ、彼ハ陸軍大臣ニナルト憲兵ガ政治ニ關與スルコトヲ嚴禁シマシタ。從ツテ憲兵ハ畑大將ニハ好意ヲ持ツテオリマセンデシタ。一九三九年或ル中佐ガ仙台デ英米打倒ノ演說ヲシタコトガアリマシタガ、畑大臣ハ非常ニ憤慨シテ、直ニ同人ヲ東京ニ召還スルト共ニ強ク叱責シテ、同人ヲ左遷シタ事ガアリマシタ。畑大將ニ對スル陸軍ノ憎惡ト嫌惡ノ念ハ此ノ陸軍ガ政治ニ關與スルコトヲ嚴禁シタコトカラ益々烈シクナリマシタ。ソシテ畑大將ヲ

陸相ノ椅子カラ追フ機會ヲ狙ツテ居タノデアリマス。

殊ニ大將ガ三國同盟ニ反對デアツタコト、米内内閣竝ビニ其ノ政策ヲ支持サレタコト、及ビ支那ニ於ケル兵力ヲ減少シ次デ支那ヨリ撤兵シテ以テ支那事變ヲ解決セントスル大將ノ要望ハ尙更反抗心ヲ煽リ參謀總長ノ緊急ノ要求トナツテ表レテ大將ヲ陸軍大臣ノ椅子カラ追出シタ次第デアリマス。假ヘ、畑大將ガ將官デアリ、又陸軍大臣デアツテモ、閑院ノ官殿下ノ辭職スベシトイフ、要求ヲ拒絕スルコトハ日本人トシテハ到底出來ナイコトデアリマス。

閑院ノ官殿下ハ皇族ノ一員デアリ、親王トシテ直系ノ皇子ニ次グ重要ナル地位ニ位シテ居リマシタ。畑大將ガ臣民トシテ、コノ要求ニ謹デ服從

シタノハ、日本國民トシテノ當然ノ行動ダツタノデアリマス。

畑大將ヲ如何ニ嫌ツテモ、彼等ハ直接何事ヲモ爲スコトハ出来マセンデシタガ遂ニ閑院ノ官殿下ノ力ヲ利用スルコトノミニ依ツテ、畑ノ辭職ヲサセルコトニ成功シタノデアリマシタ。日本人ノ道德ト習慣ヨリシテ、皇族ノ御言葉ハ臣下ニトツテハ絶對的デアリマシタ。

閑院ノ官殿下ハ明治天皇直系ノ大正天皇ニ次グベキ者ナキ時ハ天皇タルベシト御内旨ノアツタ方デアリマシタ。特ニソノ地位ガ高カツタノデアリマス。畑大將ノ信念ハ支那ト和平ヲナスベキ唯一ノ道ハ支那ヨリ撤兵ヲナスニアリ、ソレガ一時ニ出来得^レバ順次兵力ヲ減少シテ、以テ全部ノ撤兵ヲ完了シヨウト考ヘテオリマシタ。

一九四〇年畑ガ陸軍大臣タリシ時、參謀本部ノ反對ニモ拘ラズ第一着手ニ彼ノ案トシテ支那ニ於ケル日本軍ノ兵數ヲ九〇万ヨリ略々六〇万ニ減少シタ事ヲ私ハ承知シテ居リマス。

畑大將ハ汪精衛政權ノ樹立ニハ賛成シテオリマセンデシタ。ソレハ彼ガ秘密裡ニ重慶政府ト和平交渉ヲセント欲シ又在支兵力ノ撤退ヲ企畫シテオルコトデモワカルコトデス。

然シ汪精衛政府ヲ樹立スルコトハ第一次近衛内閣ヨリ平沼内閣ノトキニ國策トシテ確定シテオツタコトデアリマシテ、ソレガ米内々閣ノトキニ、其ノ形式ガ整ツタニ過ギマセン。

新政權ノ設立ニハ烟大將ハ關與シテオリマセン。一九四〇年烟大將ガ陸軍大臣タリシ時ニ企畫院ノ案トシテ、支那ノ投降者ヲ日本ノ石炭鑛山ニ使用スル件ニツイテ問題ガ起リマシタ。烟大將ハコノ案ニ反對シマシタ、彼ノ反對ガアツタ爲ニ事ハ遂ニ行ハレマセンデシタ。一九四二年烟大將ガ支那派遣軍ノ總司令官デアリマシタ。時ニ日本ノ石炭鑛山ニ支那勞働者ヲ使用セントスル案ニモ又反對ヲ致シマシタ。然シ一九四四年日本ニマシテ、烟大將ハ之ニハ何等ノ關係モ有シマセン。何トナレバ勞務ニ關スルコトハ既ニ軍ノ手ヲ離レテ大東亞省ノ管轄トナツテ居ツタカラデアリマス。從テ此レヲ如何トモスル力ヲ持チマセンデシタ。

一九三九年ノ秋烟ガ米内閣ノ陸軍大臣ニ就任スルト殆ンド同時ニ烟大將ノ熱望ニ應ジテ私ハ支那事變ノ平和的解決ニ對シテ、蔣介石ト交渉ヲ開始スル途ヲ開キマシタ。烟ガ兵數ヲ減少シ、又軍隊ヲ撤退シ支那ト和平ヲ結ブ事ヲ欲シテ居リマシタガ之ニハ強力ナ反對ガアリマシタ。此ノ理由デ、私共ハ非公式ニ又陰密ニ事ヲ運バナケレバナリマセンデシタ。然シ烟大將ハ適當ニ事ヲ始ムルニツイテ最善ヲ盡シマシタ。ソウシテ莫大ナル費用ガコノ長キ交渉ニ必要デアリマシタガ、私ハ烟大將ニ富商岩崎清七ヲ紹介シ、交渉ニ必要ナル財政的援助ヲ與ヘル期クシマシタ。烟大將ハコノ交渉ヲ進メルニツイテノ二ツノ重要ナル點ヲ示シマシタ。

一ツハ日華兩者ノ使者ノ會合ノ日時ト場所ノ取決メデアリマシテ、他ノ一ツハ和平條約ノ基礎ハ支那ヨリスベテノ日本軍ヲ撤去スル事デアリマシタ。畑大將ハ誠意ヲ示ス爲ニ私ガ前ニ述べマシタ通り次年度豫算ヲ編成スルニ當リ在支日本兵數ヲ九〇万ヨリ約六〇万ニ減少シタノデアリマシタ。然シ乍ラ、參謀本部及陸軍省内部ニ於テハ支那ヨリ撤兵スルコトニハ非常ナル反對ガアリマシタ。即チ、日本兵ハ永久ニ上海ト北支諸地域ニ駐在セシムベシトノ主張デアリマス。畑ハ之ニ對シテ反對デアリマシタ。

畑ハ支那ヨリハスベテノ軍ヲ撤兵シナケレバナラヌト信ジテ居リマシタ。畑ノ主張スル所ハ若シ支那ヨリ日本軍ヲ撤去シナイナラバ蔣介石トハ和平條約ヲ締結スル望ミハ絶對ニナイト云フノデアリマシタ。蔣介石トノ必要ナル交渉ハ非常ニ秘密ノモノデアリ、通信ハ暗號デ行ハレナケレバナリマセンデシタ。大體蔣介石側ニ對シ和平ヲナス爲ニ、畑大將ノ意志トシテ眞面目ナル企ガナサレツツアルトイフ事ヲ確信セシムル事ガ非常ニ困難デアリマシタ。然シ漸次ニ蔣介石側ガ信用スル様ニナリ、和平條約ガ出來ルトイフ事ヲ信ズルニ至リマシタ。ソウシテ將來ノ會合ノタメ、日時ト場所トヲ決定スルトイフ事ガ始リマシタ。

若シ畑大將ガ陸軍大臣ノ職ニ止ツテ居ツタナラバ和平條約ガ首尾ヨク締結サレタデアラウ事ニハ私ハ何等ノ疑ヲ持チマセン。然シ乍ラ程ナク畑

大將ハ突然ソノ職ヲ辭メタノデ、此ノ交渉ハ終リヲ告ゲタノデアリマシ
 タ。畑大將ハ若キ日獨逸ニ留學シ、ソノ總明ナル頭腦ニヨリ最モ良ク獨
 逸ノ短所ヲ知ツテオリマシタ。一方英米ノ長所ヲ最モヨク知ツテオリマ
 シタ。米國ヤ英國ト扞格シ或ヒハ衝突スル恐レアル時ハ之ニ反對デアリ
 マシタ、此ノ理由デ畑ハ三國條約ニハ非常ニ強ク反對デアリマシタ。
 一九四一年畑大將ガ支那派遣總司令官デアツタトキ、日米ノ關係ガ漸次
 ニ險惡トナリツツアル様ニ見エマシタ。畑大將ハソノ參謀長後宮大將ヲ
 個人的使者トシテ東京ニ送り米國ヤ英國ト事ヲ構ヘルガ如キ如何ナル方
 法ヤ行動ニモ反對ナル意見ナル事ヲ申述べマシタ。表面的ニハ後宮大將
 ハ或公務ニテ、東京ニ派遣セラレタノデアリマシタ。
 シカシ内實ハ彼ノ旅行ノ目的ハ當時ノ軍ノ主腦部ニ米英ト事ヲカマヘル
 コトノナイ様ニ畑ノ意見ヲ述べテ米英トノ平和増進ヲハカルコトニアリ
 マシタ。軍主腦部ノアラユル人ヲ巡リ歩イタル後、後宮大將ガ私ノ所ニ
 參リマシテ、畑大將ノ命令ノモトニ何ヲシテ居ツタカヲ話シテ呉レマシ
 タ。私ハ後宮大將ノ言フ様ニ畑ノ意願ヲ實行ニ移ス事ニ最善ノ努力ヲ致
 シマシタ。
 兵務局長トシテノ私ノ地位カラシテ、私ニ出來ル事ハ本當ニ僅カデアリ
 マシタガ、畑氏ノ考フル所ノ實現ノタメニハ、アラユル努力ヲ致シタノ
 デアリマシタ。

Def, Doc# 2206

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月二十六日 於東京陸軍省ビル

供述者 田 中 隆 吉

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且署名捺印シタルコトヲ證

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同日於同所

立會人 國 分 友 治

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